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Abstract
Using employment data for Portuguese municipalities, we find strong evidence of political business cycles.
Employment increases shortly before elections mainly in municipalities where the mayor’s party has a majority of
deputies in the municipal assembly and where she is running for reelection.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we test for the existence of political business cycles in employment in Portuguese
municipalities. We use an unexplored dataset covering all mainland municipalities from 1985 to 2000.
Our results provide strong evidence of employment increases before elections, particularly in
municipalities where the mayor’s party has a majority in the municipal assembly and where she is
running for reelection. Employment increases are notably higher in construction and public works and in
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community, social and personal services. We argue that these employment variations are a consequence
of increases in local public expenditures that were documented by Veiga and Veiga (2004).
2. Political business cycles in local employment
Although the literature on political business cycles is already extensive,1 most studies focus on the
behavior of central governments. However, Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Harrington
(1993) have developed political business cycle models that are applicable to local as well as national
governments. These models predict that incumbent politicians may increase spending prior to elections
to signal greater bcompetence.Q This occurs when voters are rationally, but imperfectly, informed. In
contrast, Nordhaus’s (1975) well-known model of the political business cycle assumes that voters are
myopically responsive to national economic conditions. Testing for the presence of local political
business cycles may therefore help to distinguish the applicability of models that would have similar
empirical implications at a national level.
In this paper, we use as our laboratory all the Portuguese mainland municipalities. In a previous paper,
Veiga and Veiga (2004) provided strong evidence of opportunistic cycles in municipalities’ expenditures,
particularly in investment items highly visible to the electorate, such as those included in spending
categories for Other Buildings and Miscellaneous Constructions (especially in Overpasses, streets and
complementary works, Rural roads, and Others). Pre-election increases in these expenditures are
consistent with an effort by mayors to signal greater competence. Building on these results, we now test
for the existence of political business cycles in municipal employment.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the change in the number of employees working in the firms
in the municipality (DEmployment). We are able to disaggregate this variable according to the
Portuguese Standard Industrial Classification (CAE) system. Changes in national employment
(DNational Employment) are used to control for the impact of the macroeconomic situation of the
country. The set of political variables used consists of the following dummy variables:
– Election year (year before election): takes the value of 1 in election years (in the year before
elections), and of zero otherwise;
– Right: equals one for municipalities run by right-wing mayors, and zero otherwise;
– Majority (minority): equals one for municipalities where the mayor’s party has a majority (minority)
in the Municipal Assembly, and zero otherwise;
– Incumbent: takes the value of 1 when the mayor is running for another term in office, and zero
otherwise.
Three additional variables are included in all models as controls:
– %Popb15: percentage of the population under 15 years old;
– %PopN65: percentage of the population over 65 years old;
– PopDens: population density.
1
For surveys of this literature see Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000).
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Data on the total number of employees in municipal firms, and according to the Portuguese Standard
Industrial Classification system, from 1985 to 2000, was obtained from the Quadros de Pessoal
database, of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).2 Data on national
employment comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Political data, namely election
dates and municipal electoral results were obtained from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the
Electoral Process (STAPE). Finally, data on the three control variables was obtained from the Portuguese
Institute of Statistics (INE).
It is worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of the local
authorities and that, during our sample period, there were no legal restrictions on the number of terms a
mayor could serve. In the period subsequent to the re-establishment of Democracy in Portugal in 1974,
municipal elections have been held in December of 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001,
and in October 2005.
The empirical model can be summarized as follows:
yit ¼ ayi;t1 þ X Vi;tbþ mi þ eit i ¼ 1; N ;N t ¼ 1; N ;Ti ð1Þ
where yit is the dependent variable (DEmployment), XitV is a vector of explanatory variables (described
above), b is a vector of parameters to be estimated, mi is the individual effect of municipality i, and eit is
2
The Quadros de Pessoal are a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all firms employing paid labor in Portugal.
Table 1
Political business cycles in employment
DEmployment 1 2 3 4 5
DEmployment (1)  .131 (5.49)**  .133 (5.58)**  .130 (5.49)**  .131 (5.58)**  .131 (5.50)**
DNational Employment .245 (4.74)** .320 (5.19)** .243 (4.73)** .237 (4.49)** .245 (4.74)**
Election Year 2.543 (4.16)** 3.477 (5.14)**
Year Before Election 1.961 (2.94)**
Right 2.010 (3.58)** 1.930 (3.38)** 1.661 (2.75)** 2.173 (3.73)** 2.006(3.59)**
Election Year*Right 3.497 (3.59)**
Election Year*Left 1.808 (2.26)*
Majority .917 (1.49)
Election Year*Majority 3.610 (3.63)**
Election Year*Minority 1.326 (1.64)
Election Year* Incumbent 2.952 (4.28)**
Election Year*Not Incumbent .986 (.69)
# Observations 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 275
Sargan test ( p-value) .308 .294 .322 .314 .298
Sources: IMF(IFS), INE, MTSS and STAPE.
Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equation in
levels), using the econometric software Stata 8.2.
The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Popb15, %PopN65, and PopDens (included in all estimations) are
not shown in order to economize space.
Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.
T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1% and *, 5%.
Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically v2. P-value is
reported. The hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is never rejected.
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Table 2
Political businees cycles in employment by economic activity
CEA 1
Agriculture,
Sylviculture,
Hunting and
Fisheries
CEA 2
Extractive
Industries
CEA 3
Transforming
Industries
CEA 4
Electricity,
Gas and
Water
CEA 5
Construction
and Public
Works
CEA 6
Commerce,
Restaurants
and Hotels
CEA 7
Transportation,
Storage and
Communications
CEA 8
Banks, Insurances,
Real Estate,
and Services
to Firms
CEA 9
Community,
Social, and
Personal Services
Dep. Var. (1)  .063
(4.06)**
 .035
(4.61)**
 .120
(6.99)**
 .049
(3.57)**
 .067
(3.70)**
 .166
(7.35)**
 .176
(2.94)**
 .146
(5.26)**
 .066
(4.19)**
DNational
Employment
1.004
(2.78)**
.591 (0.98) .122 (.70) .934 (3.00)** 1.243 (4.56)** .001 (.02) .875 (4.00)** .352 (2.52)* 1.504 (5.32)**
Election Year 6.559 (1.08) 19.569
(2.19)*
1.190 (.74) 10.094
(2.26)*
11.283
(4.48)**
.818 (1.00) 4.489
( .97)
8.742 (9.00)** 15.155 (5.24)**
Year Before
Election
7.023 (2.06)* 10.638 (2.10)*
Right 7.958
(1.41)
10.666
(0.90)
1.110 (.97) 9.746
(1.25)
4.114 (1.86)* 1.791
(2.63)**
1.572 (.61) .994 (1.37) 2.935 ( .83)
# Observations 3690 2399 3844 3571 3782 3690 3844 3838 3828
# Municipalities 274 226 275 274 275 274 275 275 275
Sargan test
( p-value)
.238 .835 .478 .165 .342 .238 .221 .194 .072
Sources: IMF(IFS), INE, MTSS and STAPE.
Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric
software Stata 8.2. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.
The dependent variable is the percentage change in municipal employment for the classification of economic activity indicated in the respective column.
The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Popb15, %PopN65, and PopDens (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to economize
space. T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1% and *, 5%.
Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically v2. P-value is reported. The hypothesis of no second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is never rejected.
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the error term. Given the presence of individual effects, mi, the model above can be estimated assuming
those effects as fixed or random. But, the lagged value of the dependent variable would be correlated
with the error term, eit, even if the latter is not serially correlated. According to Arellano and Bond
(1991), this implies inconsistent estimates of the model, when, as in our sample, there is a clear
dominance of cross sections (275 municipalities) over time periods (16 years). These authors developed
a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that solves the problems noted above. First
differencing (1) removes the individual effects (mi) and produces an equation that is estimable by
instrumental variables. In this paper, we use the extended version of the GMM estimator proposed by
Blundell and Bond (1998).3
Table 1 shows the results of estimations for changes in total municipal empl yment. In the first two
columns, we can see that employment increases during electoral years (and the year before), relative to
the remaining years of the electoral cycle, and that right-wing mayors increase local employment more
than left-wing ones. Then, we tested for differences in opportunistic behavior according to ideology
(column 3), the level of support the mayor enjoys at the Municipal Assembly (column 4), and the
mayor’s decision to run or not for another term in office (column 5). Results indicate that pre-election
increases in local employment occur only when the mayor is running for reelection and when the
mayor’s party has a majority of deputies in the Municipal Assembly. In these circumstances mayors have
both stronger incentives and greater power to manipulate spending. These effects are stronger in
municipalities led by right-wing mayors.
When we perform the tests in employment series disaggregated by sector of activity (see Table 2), we
find that employment increases in electoral years are stronger, and more significant, in Construction and
Public Works and Community, Social and Personal Services. This result is not surprising if we take into
account Veiga and Veiga’s (2004) finding of strong evidence of opportunistic cycles in Portuguese
municipalities’ investment expenditures in Other Buildings, Miscellaneous Constructions and Other
Investments.4
3. Conclusion
Using an unexplored dataset describing employment in all mainland Portuguese municipalities over a
period of 16 years, we provide strong evidence of political business cycles in local employment.5
Although mayors do not control a large fraction of local employment directly, they affect it indirectly
through municipal expenditures that generate jobs in local firms. By improving local economic
conditions shortly before elections, mayors may signal their competence to the electorate and improve
their chances of reelection, consistent with the rational political business cycle models introduced by
Rogoff and Sibert (1988).
4
On these series there are increases in the election year, relative to the sample mean, of 14.9%, 10.4% and 21.7%, respectively.
5
It is worth noting that results are basically the same when we use employment levels (employment as a percentage of municipal population)
instead of changes in employment. These results are available from the authors upon request.
3
Difference Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, this system-GMM estimator, which combines the first-differenced equations with the
equation in levels, is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991), which only includes the first-differenced equations. In all estimations, the
instruments used for the lagged dependent variable were the following: levels lagged 2 and 3 periods were used in the equations in first
differences, and once lagged first differences were used in the equation in levels. Since the remaining explanatory variables are exogenous, they
were used as their own instruments.
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